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Footnotes 
1. See Madison B. McClellan, Merit Appointment Versus Popular
Election: A Reformer’s Guide to Judicial Selection Methods in Florida,
43 FLA. L. REV. 529, 54 (quoting the Florida Bar’s definition of
“merit selection” as “a method for selecting judges solely on the
basis of merit rather than through the popular election process”).
2. See id. at 533-39.
3. See John L. Remsen, Is Merit Selection and Retention a Good Idea?
Yes: We’ll Get Better Judges, 17 FLA. BAR NEWS 1, 9 (Jan 15, 1990).
4. See FLA. CONST., art. V, § 11.
5. See id. § 11(d).  Currently, there are 26 JNCs.
6. See Symposium, The 1997-98 Florida Constitutional Revision
Commission: Judicial Election or Merit Selection, 52 FLA.L.REV. 411,
417 (2000).
7. See generally Fla.R.Ct., Uniform Rules of Procedure for Judicial
Nominating Commissions (1999).
8. See id.
9. See McClellan, supra note 1, at 531.
10. Telephone interview with Vicki Russell, JNC coordinator for the
Florida Bar (June 19, 2000).
11. See id. (The application is actually titled “Questionnaire for
Gubernatorial Appointments.”)
12. Interview with Reginald J. Brown, Deputy General Counsel to
Governor Jeb Bush (June 28, 2000). 
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Russell, supra note 10.
16. See id.
In the November 2000 election, the citizens of Florida hadthe opportunity to switch from the  nonpartisan elective sys-tem to a merit selection and retention system for selecting
trial judges in their respective circuits and counties.  Although
the majority of Florida voters favored electing their trial judges,
this issue has spurred intense debate in the legal community
concerning which is the better method for judicial selection.
The crux of the debate centers on whether the judiciary should
be independent or accountable to the public.  On one end of the
spectrum, judges are seen as heads of a branch of government
that should be accountable to the citizens of their jurisdiction.
On the opposite end, judges are viewed as different in that
ethics, and not politics, dictate their governmental role.  It is
this ideological disparity that fostered the creation of the merit
selection and retention system.
Prior to the November election, the merit system was being
promoted as a great compromise of both ideologies.  Merit
selection is a form of direct appointment and is intended to pre-
serve judicial independence.  Merit retention is a form of pop-
ular election and is intended to encourage accountability.
Although the merit system comprises two distinct methods of
judicial selection to serve both interests, it is ineffective for
judicial selection.  Specifically, merit selection increases the pol-
itics that encompass direct appointment, and merit retention
revisits the campaign issues that plague popular elections.
However, some significant changes in the merit system would
make it more effective for judicial selection.
MERIT SELECTION
The concept of merit selection evolved from the direct
appointment method used in the federal system for judicial
selection.  However, merit selection replaces the appointive role
of the executive branch with an independent nominating com-
mission who select judges solely on the basis of merit.1
Although the idea for merit selection was proposed in the early
1900s, it wasn’t until 1976 when Florida adopted this method
for selection of appellate judges.2 Proponents contend that
merit selection retains the benefits of direct appointment, i.e.,
judicial independence.3 However, the very element that
ensures judicial independence, i.e., appointment, also threat-
ens judicial independence because of its political tendencies.
The Merit Selection Method
The current merit selection method used to select Florida’s
appellate judges is the same as that proposed in November’s elec-
tion for selecting trial judges.4 Basically, this method uses judi-
cial nominating commissions, which are formed for each judi-
cial circuit and district around the state, including one for the
supreme court, in the event of a vacancy.5 Each commission is
composed of lawyers and lay persons for the purpose of recruit-
ing, investigating, and screening judicial candidates.6 The com-
mission selects between three to six most qualified judicial can-
didates and submits the list to the governor.7 The governor then
appoints one judge from the list of nominees.8 To understand
the “merit” element of this method of judicial selection, we must
discuss the nominating procedures in more detail. 
JNC Membership
Each judicial nominating commission (hereinafter, “JNC”)
consists of nine members who are appointed in groups of three
from three separate appointing authorities.9 First, the governor
appoints three JNC members, who consist of lawyers and lay
persons.10 Those persons interested in a gubernatorial
appointment to a JNC must complete and submit an executive
appointment application to the governor’s office.11 Once all
applications have been received, the governor’s legal office
reviews the applications and informally interviews the appli-
cants.12 The legal office then discusses the applicants with the
governor and makes recommendations for appointment.13 The
governor then selects three people for appointment to a JNC.14
Next, the Florida Bar’s Board of Governors appoints three
Florida Bar members.15 Those attorneys interested in serving
on a JNC must complete and submit an application.16 Once all
of the applications are received, the Board of Governors forms
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Retention, http://www.flabar.org>(last updated Feb. 2000).
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24. See id.
25. See William H. Overton, Judicial Nominating Procedures, 73 FLA.
B.J. 72-73 (June 1999) (Report on the JNC Institute held on Jan.
20, 1999 in Miami).
26. See Symposium, supra note 6, at 417.
27. FLA. CONST., art. V, § 8.  Eligibility for circuit and county courts
judgeships requires membership with the Florida Bar for at least
five years.  Eligibility for supreme court and district court of
appeals judgeships requires membership with the Florida Bar for
at least ten years.
28. Russell, supra note 10.
29. See id.
30. See Uniform Rules, supra note 7.
31. See id. and Russell, supra note 10.
32. Russell, supra note 10.  However, Ms. Russell states currently
there is a problem getting minority applicants.  She stated that the
Judicial Nominating Procedures Committee is conducting studies
to determine what more needs to be done to promote diversity on
the bench.
33. See Uniform Rules, supra note 7.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Russell, supra note 10.
37. See id.
38. See Remsen, supra note 3, at 8.
39. Final voting procedure for the supreme court JNC is much more
extensive and detailed.  
40. Russell, supra note 10. 
41. Brown, supra note 12.
42. See id.
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a screening committee to review the applications and make
recommendations to the board for each JNC vacancy.17 The
board then decides on three lawyers to serve on a JNC.18
The final three JNC members are lay persons appointed by
a majority vote of the six members previously appointed by the
governor and the Florida Bar.19 These members also complete
and submit an application.20 Once all of the applications are
received, the six JNC members conduct their own screening
and interviewing process to determine the three remaining
JNC members.21 Diversity in JNC membership is encouraged
but not mandatory.   Legislation that mandated the appoint-
ment of at least one minority from each of the three separate
appointing authorities was ruled unconstitutional.22
Once a person is appointed to serve on a JNC, he or she is
required to attend the “JNC Institute” for proper training.23
The Florida Bar conducts this “institute,” which is a one-day
training seminar held at least once a year that is designed to
educate new JNC members on the nominating process.24 In
addition to educational training, the seminar also provides an
opportunity for commissioners to discuss improvements in the
JNC process.25
The JNC Screening Process
The purpose of JNCs is to recruit, investigate, and screen
judicial candidates to fill vacancies on the bench.26 Currently,
the only legal requirement for most judicial candidates is that
they must be members of the Florida Bar for at least five
years.27 However, the JNCs also consider a nonexclusive list of
criteria set forth in the uniform rules28 and conduct extensive
background investigations and personal interviews subject to
the uniform rules.29
The JNC screening process begins when judicial candi-
dates submit a comprehensive application to the JNC of rele-
vant jurisdiction.30 Since the application does not request
information regarding race or ethnicity,31 diversity among the
applicants is encouraged through notices to minority bar
associations.32 Once all of the applications are received, the
JNC determines if the applicants meet the initial legal
requirements for the office
and conducts extensive back-
ground investigations on the
candidates.33
The background investiga-
tions of the judicial candidates
vary depending upon the
vacancy.  For instance, a
vacancy on the supreme court
may require a more extensive
background check than would a judgeship for a district court
of appeal or circuit court.34 Once the background investiga-
tion is complete, the JNC then personally interviews the can-
didates.35 These interviews are open to the public and are usu-
ally announced in local papers or on a notice posted at the
courthouse.36 Each JNC can employ its own interviewing
process subject to the uniform rules.37 These interviews are
notoriously arduous and involve tough personal and profes-
sional questions that usually address sensitive social issues.38
Once the investigations and interviews are complete, a major-
ity vote of the JNC members determines the final list of at least
three judicial nominees.39 This list is then submitted to the
governor in alphabetical order without any ranking or addi-
tional recommendations.40
Upon receiving the list of nominees from the JNC, the gov-
ernor’s legal office begins its screening and interviewing
process.41 The intensity of this screening process depends on
the judicial vacancy.42 Once the investigations and interviews
are complete, the governor meets with the legal office and then
appoints one nominee from the final list to fill the judicial
vacancy.43
Arguments Regarding Merit Selection
The ideological debate between judicial independence and
accountability is an interesting one.  Advocates for merit selec-
tion contend that an appointment system for judicial selection
preserves judicial independence by minimizing political influ-
ence, ensures judicial quality through an autonomous screen-
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46. See Buddy Nevins, Adviser on Judicial Position Quits; Report About
Business Dealings With Candidate Leads to Resignation, SUN-
SENTINEL (FT. LAUD.), Oct. 12, 1996, at 3B, available at LEXIS,
Individual News Publication database.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See Uniform Rules, supra note 7. 
50. See Nevins, supra note 46.
51. See Dan Christensen, Leaving and Joining the JNC, Quietly,
BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., Jan. 9, 1997, at A1, available at LEXIS,
News Group File database.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See John Grogan, Smell Should Lead Investigators to JNC, SUN-
SENTINEL (FT. LAUD.), Jan. 5, 1996, at 1B, available at LEXIS, News
Group File database.
57. See id.  See also, Bill Douthat, Witnesses: Politics Moves JNC, THE
PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 5, 1996, at 1B (one candidate made several
lies regarding her income and legal experience on her application,
and another clearly appeared untrustworthy during his inter-
view); and Stephanie Smith, Sach’s Role on JNC Attacked; Ex-Bar
Official: Lawyer Tried to Stack Nomination, SUN-SENTINEL (FT.
LAUD.), Jan. 6, 1996, at 1B (candidates who had 25 years legal
experience or who were sitting county court judges were suspi-
ciously not considered).
58. See Grogan, supra note 56.
59. See id.
60. See id.  See also Victor Epstein, New Head of JNC Must Deal With
Debris from ‘95 Skirmish, PALM BEACH DAILY BUS. REV., July 31,
1997, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Group File database.
61. See Grogan, supra note 56 (the JNC recommended the wife to the
governor on a 7-2 vote).  
62. See id.
63. See Steve Nichol, Lawyer in JNC Case Lashes Out at Critics, SUN-
SENTINEL (FT. LAUD.), Jan. 19, 1996, at 3B, available at LEXIS,
News Group File database.
64. See Editorial, Chiles Should Disband JNC, SUN-SENTINEL (FT.
LAUD.), Jan. 21, 1996, at 4G, available at LEXIS, News Group File
database.
65. However, this incident prompted the Florida Bar to implement
screening procedures to evaluate potential bar appointees to a
JNC.  See Editorial, JNC Fiasco May Yield Good Result: Reform of
Judicial Selection Process, SUN-SENTINEL (FT. LAUD.), Feb. 7, 1996,
at 16A, available at LEXIS, News Group File database.
ing process, and promotes
judicial diversity through
rules and persistence.44
Opponents argue that merit
selection sacrifices account-
ability and merely substitutes
one political system of selec-
tion for another.  Although
arguments for both sides are
convincing, the contention
that merit selection preserves judicial independence fails.
The main argument supporting merit selection is that it
retains judicial independence because the process minimizes
political influence.45 However, any kind of political influence,
no matter how slight, jeopardizes judicial independence.  The
problem lies primarily with the JNCs’ current nominating pro-
cedures, which create an atmosphere that is ripe for political
influence and manipulation.  This potential for abuse is evi-
denced in several incidents involving judicial candidates, JNC
members, and the selection process.
For example, in 1996, a lay member of a JNC in Ft.
Lauderdale resigned his position after a newspaper uncovered
his failure to reveal his past business relationship with a can-
didate for circuit court.46 Specifically, the JNC member had
once been president, and the judicial candidate vice president,
of a now-defunct firm in downtown Ft. Lauderdale.47 In fact,
this past business relationship was not uncovered until after
the candidate made the final list of nominees.48 Currently, the
uniform rules mandate JNC members to disclose to the JNC
panel all personal, professional, and business relationships
with an applicant.49 But there is no law that requires such dis-
closure.50
Another incident that raised suspicion with JNC operations
occurred in 1997, where Governor Chiles appointed an indi-
vidual to a JNC before the vacancy was even announced.51 The
former JNC member kept his resignation of his JNC position a
secret from the public and the other JNC members out of def-
erence to Governor Chiles who appointed him.52 However,
Governor Chiles appointed a new JNC member before the res-
ignation or the JNC opening was made official.53 Even more
strange was the fact that the new JNC appointee was a long-
time political friend of the former JNC member.54 Although
both JNC members and the governor denied any wrongdoing,
the mere appearance of impropriety spoke volumes.55
Probably the strongest example of the potential for politi-
cal manipulation on JNCs is an incident that occurred in
1996 in Palm Beach.56 Suspicion of the JNC began with the
commission’s recommendation of three judicial candidates
who were conspicuously unqualified.57 In fact, the JNC chair
sent Governor Chiles a letter apologizing for the selection,
which then prompted a formal investigation into the JNC’s
operations.58 Shortly thereafter, the commission quickly
ousted their chairman in a secret meeting.59 Although the
investigation was hampered due to uncooperative JNC mem-
bers and lack of evidence, it was revealed that one of the
three judicial nominees was the wife of a member of the
Florida Bar’s Board of Governors.60 Further, this board mem-
ber-husband was instrumental in appointing two attorneys to
the JNC who, in turn, effectively advocated the wife for a
judgeship.61 Also, one of the JNC’s strongest supporters of
the wife’s judgeship was a long-time political friend of the
husband.62 Additionally, there were allegations that during
the wife’s interview with JNC members, some members
“shepherded” the wife past questions addressing several dis-
crepancies on her judicial application.63 Nonetheless, even
though some critics called for the disbandment of the JNC,64
the commission continued operating.65
Besides JNC membership, another source for political influ-
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LAUD.), Jan. 2, 2000, at 6H, available at LEXIS, News Group File data-
base.
67. See id. See also FLA. CONST., art. I ,§ 24(b).
68. See Uniform Rules, supra note 7.
69. See Editorial, supra note 66.
70. See Jamie Malernee, Judicial Selection Process Criticized, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999, at 1, available at LEXIS, STPETE database.
71. See id.
72. See Editorial, supra note 66.
73. See Russell, supra note 10.
74. See Russell Troutman, Florida Judicial Nominating Commission, 54
FLA. B. J. 534 (1980) (Mr. Troutman discussed his experiences
when he was a member of the Florida Supreme Court JNC). See
also McClellan, supra note 1, at 547.
75. See Fla. Bar Online, News Media Center, Mark D. Killian, Panel Takes
Testimony at Third Merit Selection Hearing, <http://www.flabar.org/
newflabar/publicmediainfo/tfbnews/99nov15-8. html>(Nov. 15,
1999)  (Alfonso Perez, Jr. stated that when he chaired the 11th
Circuit JNC “county court judges who wanted to be elevated to the
circuit bench would appear behind me in a pew in church and I
knew they weren’t members of the church”).
76. See Overton, supra note 25.
77. See McClellan, supra note 1, at 547.
78. See id. at 548.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See Symposium, supra note 6, at 417.
82. See id.
83. See FLA. CONST., art. V, § 10(a).
84. See Fla. Bar Online, News Media Center, Merit Selection and
Retention, <http://www.flabar.org> (last updated Feb. 2000).
85. See id.
86. See Symposium, supra note 6, at 420.
ence are the closed JNC deliberations.66 Interestingly, school
board deliberations regarding appointment of a new superin-
tendent are constitutionally required to be open to the pub-
lic.67 However, JNC deliberations regarding the selection of
judicial nominees are currently closed to the public.68
Naturally, this secrecy could facilitate backroom dealing and
foster public distrust.69 This was evident in the incident
involving the Palm Beach JNC and a recent incident involving
the Fifth District Court of Appeal JNC.  In 1999, a JNC mem-
ber spoke out against the actions of two JNC colleagues who
had personal meetings with sitting appellate judges to gather
facts regarding judicial candidates.70 It was argued that
although judicial ethics allow judges to communicate “factu-
ally and succinctly” to the JNC, the appearance of impropriety
is manifest because the meetings were conducted privately.71
Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that closed JNC delibera-
tions would also create the appearance of impropriety, as well
as perpetuate public distrust of JNC operations and fuel suspi-
cions of favoritism and political maneuvering.72
Finally, another source for potential political abuse in JNCs
is the considerable opportunity for lobbying.  Currently, there
is no rule censuring contact with JNC members during the
nomination process.73 Consequently, former JNC members
report receiving numerous phone calls and letters from the
candidate’s friends, relatives, clients, and influential commu-
nity leaders.74 Also, there were some incidents where the can-
didates themselves would attempt direct contact with a JNC
member.75 But efforts have been made to curb lobbying efforts
of JNCs.  Recently, the Judicial Nominating Procedures
Committee discussed developing an advisory letter that would
inform candidates as to what constitutes appropriate contact
with JNC members.76 Nonetheless, until a rule limiting con-
tact between JNC members and judicial candidates or their
supporters is implemented, merit selection has the potential of
becoming a lobbying contest instead of a merit contest.77
The apparent opportunity for political influence in JNC
operations is not the only threat to judicial independence.  The
governor’s influence regarding judicial appointments also plays
a significant role in maintaining politics in the judiciary.78 For
instance, the governor can politically control a JNC by
appointing someone based upon personal friendship or politi-
cal relationship.79 More
importantly, the governor’s
JNC appointees could then
influence the other three
lawyers when determining the
remaining three lay members.
Thus, the governor could
arguably control the list of
judicial nominees because of
his or her dominating influ-
ence over the commission.80
Advocates for merit selection concede that merit selection is
not perfect, but contend that it preserves judicial indepen-
dence because political influence is minimized.  However, any
amount of political influence can threaten judicial indepen-
dence.  Even the appearance of political abuse or manipulation
can promote public distrust of lawyers and the entire judicial
system.  The fact that merit selection has already existed in
Florida for over twenty years does not exemplify success.
Merit selection is not perfect, but its flaws can be corrected.
MERIT RETENTION
Merit retention is a form of the elective system where voters
decide whether to retain the incumbent judge by casting a sim-
ple “yes” or “no” vote on ballots within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of their court.81 If the judge obtains more affirmative votes,
then he or she is retained for another term of judgeship.82
Thereafter, the trial judge would stand for review every six
years.83 However, if the judge receives more negative votes, their
judgeship is deemed vacant and is subsequently filled through
the merit selection process.84 Although merit retention is
thought to provide a democratic balance to the merit selection
process, it resurrects  the problems  inherent in judicial elec-
tions.85 To fully understand this reasoning, we must first discuss
the arguments regarding the election method.
The Election Method
In the November 2000 general election, Florida citizens
voted to continue selecting their trial judges in their respective
communities by popular nonpartisan elections.86 Advocates
for judicial elections contend that this method of judicial selec-
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No: It’s Voters’ Right to Elect, 17 FLA. BAR NEWS 1, 11 (Jan. 15, 1990).
88. See Justice Ben F. Overton, Trial Judges and Political Elections: A
Time For Re-examination, 2 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 15 (1988-
89).
89. See McClellan, supra note 1, at 555-57.
90. See Symposium, supra note 6, at 419.
91. See id. at 418.
92. See Symposium, supra note 6, at 419.
93. See McClellan, supra note 1, at 556.
94. See Mackenzie v. Breakstone, 565 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1990).
95. See id.  
96. Mackenzie v Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 571 So. 2d 32 (Fla.
App. 1990).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 1334.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 1337.
105. See id.
106. See id.  Canon 7B(2) [now C(1)] of the CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT provides:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judi-
cial office that is filled by public election between compet-
ing candidates should not himself solicit campaign funds,
or solicit attorneys for publicly stated support, but he may
establish committees of responsible persons to secure and
manage the expenditure of funds for his campaign and
obtain public statements of support for his candidacy.
Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting cam-
paign contributions and public support from any persons
or corporation authorized by law.  A candidate’s commit-
tees may solicit funds for his campaign only within the
time limitation provided by law.  A candidate should not
use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the
private benefit of himself or members of his family.
FLA. STAT.§ 106.08(1) (1987), provided in pertinent part:
(1) No person, political committee, or committee of
continuous existence shall make contributions to any can-
didate or political committee in this state, for any election,
in excess of the following amounts:
(e) To a candidate for county court or
circuit court judge, $1000.
(f) To a candidate for retention as a
tion preserves the democratic
process and ensures direct
accountability to the public.87
However, opponents of the
election method stress that
judges are different in that
their position does not
require accountability like
that of legislative and execu-
tive officials.88 Furthermore,
judicial elections require cam-
paign contributions, which
threaten judicial indepen-
dence.89 Although popular
elections provide a more democratic means of judicial selec-
tion, the judiciary is a unique branch of government where
legal ethics—instead of politics—govern judicial behavior.
The main argument against judicial elections for which
there appears to be no resolution is the issue of judicial cam-
paign contributions.90 Like all elections for public office, judi-
cial elections cost money, and the expense necessary to run a
judicial campaign is substantially high.91 Although some judi-
cial candidates are able to finance their own campaigns, private
financial contributions from lawyers, law firms, and special
interest groups are the norm.92 Consequently, judicial inde-
pendence, impartiality, and ethics are compromised, and the
appearance of impropriety becomes apparent.93 This concern
is evidenced in several Florida cases.  
For instance, in Mackenzie v. Breakstone94, the plaintiff ’s
attorney contributed $500 to the trial judge’s husband’s cir-
cuit court campaign, and the defendant moved to disqualify
the trial judge on these grounds.  The trial judge denied the
motion as legally insufficient.  On appeal, the Third District
court held that the $500 contribution by the plaintiff ’s attor-
ney constituted a legally sufficient ground for disqualifica-
tion.95 In MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc.,96 the
defendant also moved to disqualify the same trial judge on
the same grounds as in Breakstone.97 The trial judge stated
that based upon the Third District’s ruling in Breakstone, the
defendant’s motion was legally sufficient for disqualifica-
tion.98 However, the trial judge concluded that since the con-
tributing attorney’s motion for withdrawal was granted, her
recusal from this proceeding was not necessary and ulti-
mately denied the defendant’s motion for disqualification.99
The two cases were then consolidated for purposes of en banc
consideration by the Third District court.100 The district
court determined that the $500 contribution was substantial
enough to cause a reasonable person to fear that they would
not receive a fair trial.101
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court noted that the per-
ception of bias is feasible where a judge receives a campaign
contribution from a litigant or an attorney currently before the
judge.102 However, it concluded that an allegation that a liti-
gant or an attorney made a campaign contribution to the pre-
siding trial judge, or the judge’s spouse, alone was not legally
sufficient to warrant the judge’s disqualification.103
The court’s analysis focused primarily on the statutory limits
and disclosure requirements on campaign contributions in
judicial elections.104 Specifically, the court acknowledged the
judge’s need for campaign contributions and noted that because
most of these contributions come from lawyers, the appearance
of impropriety in the judiciary is of special concern.105 In
response to this concern, statutes and provisions in Florida’s
Code of Judicial Conduct restrained solicitation of campaign
funds, imposed monetary limits on campaign contributions,
and required public disclosure of such contributions.106 The
court believed that although this legislation did  not negate the
existence of a reasonable fear of prejudice, it did virtually elim-
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(g) To a candidate for retention as a justice of the
Supreme Court, $3000.
It should be noted that this language has changed.  Currently,
Section 106.08(1), Florida Statutes (1999), prohibits contributions in
excess of $500 to any candidate for election or retention, or  any
political committee supporting or opposing said candidates.
Section 106.07, Florida Statutes (1987), requires a designated
campaign treasurer to file regular reports disclosing contributors and
the amount of contribution. 
107. See id. at 1337.
108. See Symposium, supra note 6, at 419.
109. See Mackenzie v. Breakstone, 565 So. 2d  at 1341-43.
110. See Susan E. Liontas, Judicial Elections Have No Winners, 20
STETSON. L. REV. 309 (1990).
111. See id. at 322.
112. See id. at 313.
113. See id.
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One “Best” Method? 23 FLA.ST.U.L. REV. 1, 10 (Summer 1995).
118. See McClellan, supra note 1, at 555-56.  See also Norman
Krivosha, Acquiring Judges by the Merit Selection Method: The
Case for Adopting Such a Method, 40 S.W.L.J. 15, 21 (1986).
119. See FLA. JUD. CODE OF CONDUCT, Canon 7C(2).
120. See Liontas, supra note 110, at 317.
121. See Webster, supra note 117, at 35-36.
122. See McClellan, supra note 1, at 549.
123. See id.
124. See Webster, supra note 117, at 36.
125. See id.
inate any appearance of impropriety.107 Also, the court feared
that to rule otherwise would result in judicial chaos, where too
many attorneys and judges would be barred from cases due to
campaign contributions.108 However, Justice Kogan and Justice
Overton mentioned changing to a merit retention system in
light of the problems presented in the case.109
Like the majority in Breakstone, election advocates believe
that statutory limits and disclosure requirements would allevi-
ate the problems associated with judicial campaign contribu-
tions from other lawyers.110 For instance, it is believed that
requiring all campaign funding through campaign committees
creates a kind of anonymity that minimizes the appearance of
possible quid pro quo relationships.111 However, other factors
may reveal a contributor’s identity.112 For example, the very
disclosure laws that require candidates to file reports revealing
their campaign contributions would also reveal the contribu-
tors’ names.113 Also, fund-raising events where the candidates
come in direct contact with their supporters and volunteer
workers would easily reveal contributors.114 Thus, funding
through campaign committees would not eliminate the appear-
ance of quid pro quo.
Also, monetary limits on judicial campaign contributions
do not eliminate the appearance of impropriety, because the
problem is not the amount of money contributed, but the act
of contributing itself.115 Although Breakstone held that a con-
tribution from a lawyer alone was legally insufficient to require
disqualification of a judge, the appearance of impropriety still
lingers.116 Mere acceptance of campaign funds, whether
through a committee as required or individually, creates a
financial relationship between the judge and the contributor,
which virtually induces a quid pro quo effect.117 Consequently,
this mere appearance of impropriety diminishes public confi-
dence in judicial impartiality and independence.118
Because campaign contributions are an integral part of
judicial elections, the problems associated with them render
the elective system unsuitable for judicial selection.  The
consequential appearance of impropriety, and the fact that
legal ethics essentially govern the judicial office, prevents
popular elections from being an acceptable method for judi-
cial selection. 
The Merit Retention
Method
Although merit retention
is promoted as the answer
to maintaining democracy
in selecting our judges, it
resurrects the same prob-
lems inherent in judicial
elections.  For instance,
merit retention elections
require citizens to vote
whether to retain the
incumbent judge based
upon “merit,” or his or her
record.  Therefore, retention elections are uncontested by
other judicial candidates.  However, incumbent judges can
still be contested by special interest groups causing campaign
contribution issues to return.  However, adequate education
of the public could minimize potential opposition during
retention elections and, thus, abrogate the need to campaign
and solicit contributions.
The main problem with merit retention elections is the
return of campaign contribution issues.  Currently, pursuant to
merit retention procedures, a judge cannot actively campaign
or raise campaign funds unless faced with active opposition.119
Advocates for merit retention believe that because the incum-
bent is uncontested, campaign contributions become less sig-
nificant.120 However, although retention elections are uncon-
tested by judicial candidates, an incumbent can still be con-
tested by a disgruntled special interest group.121
For instance, in 1990, Florida Supreme Court Justice
Leander Shaw faced strong opposition from Citizens for a
Responsible Judiciary because of an opinion he authored that
struck down a statute requiring parental consent before minors
could obtain an abortion.122 Although a majority of lawyers
and judges believed Justice Shaw was a competent justice, his
retention was still intensely challenged.123 As a result, he was
forced to raise and spend approximately $300,000 on his reten-
tion campaign.124 Ultimately, over 40% of Florida’s citizens
voted to remove Justice Shaw.125
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Also, Florida Supreme Court
Justice Rosemary Barkett faced
strong opposition from several dif-
ferent groups in her 1992 retention
election.  The Citizens for a
Responsible Judiciary, who was the
same group that opposed Justice
Shaw two years earlier, opposed
Justice Barkett’s retention for joining
Justice Shaw’s majority opinion
striking down parental consent for
abortions.126 This group also cam-
paigned that Justice Barkett was “soft on crime” and managed to
get more than half of the state’s law enforcement and state attor-
neys to oppose Justice Barkett’s retention.127 Also, Florida Right
to Life opposed Justice Barkett for her opinion which stated that
permanently incapacitated people who have a living will or the
like are not subject to forced feeding.128 Consequently, Justice
Barkett received one of the lowest bar poll ratings ever given to
a supreme court justice in the history of the bar’s merit-retention
poll.129 As a result, Justice Barkett raised between $270,000 and
$300,000, most of which came from lawyers, to fight her oppo-
sition.130 Her campaign included television commercials and
radio ads, literature, and personal appearances.131 Ultimately,
Justice Barkett was retained with only 60% of the vote.132
These examples demonstrate that incumbent judges in
retention elections are still fair game for opposition.  Once an
incumbent judge’s retention is opposed, the judge must engage
in a costly campaign that is primarily funded with private cam-
paign contributions.  Thus, a change in the merit retention
process is very much needed. 
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE OR ALTERNATIVES
The proposed compromise in the merit selection and reten-
tion method for judicial selection is not perfect.  However,
judicial independence and accountability can coexist with a
few adjustments.  For instance, changing the composition of
JNCs and reforming JNC procedures with regard to judicial
selection will significantly decrease political influence and
improve judicial quality.  Also, adequate education of the
retention process combined with bar polls and judicial evalua-
tions will encourage judicial accountability.  Thus, if the pub-
lic is properly educated and informed, the need for retention
campaigns would be greatly reduced.
Proposed Changes in Merit Selection
As previously noted, one problem with merit selection is the
potential for political influence.  In order to eliminate this
problem, some reform in the merit selection system is
required.  This reform includes changing the composition of
the JNC and implementing laws that would open JNC deliber-
ations to the public and restrict lobbying of JNC members.
First, altering the JNC composition would minimize the
potential for political abuse.  For instance, change the number
of JNC members from nine to seven.  The three Florida Bar
appointments and three lay-member positions would remain.
However, the third set of gubernatorial appointments would be
replaced with one member from the Judicial Qualifications
Commission (JQC).133 Each of the thirteen JQC members
would serve on two of the twenty-six JNCs.  Since the purpose
of the JQC is to investigate judges and justices for alleged judi-
cial misconduct during their term of office, it seems logical
that a JQC member participate in judicial selection.134
Moreover, removing the governor’s participation in the JNC
membership and adding a JQC member to the mix would
essentially decrease political influence and increase the focus
on quality.135
The governor should not be completely removed from the
judicial selection picture.  The new seven-member JNC would
still provide a list of three to six nominees for judgeship to the
governor for appointment.  To maintain accountability, the
governor’s appointment would be confirmed by the Senate.
This would provide the necessary “check” on the governor’s
judicial appointments.
Additionally, because the JNC membership will be reduced
from nine to seven, each JNC should be funded in an amount
sufficient to retain two full-time investigators to assist in back-
ground checks, interview preparation, and general reviews on
candidates’ qualifications.136 These investigators would come
from the private sector and would be chosen by a majority vote
of the JNC membership.  Also, with regard to diversity in JNC
membership, section 43.29 and the uniform rules of JNC pro-
cedure would still encourage the appointment of minorities to
serve on JNCs.
Another remedy that would virtually eliminate political
influence is to open JNC deliberations to the public and main-
tain a public record of the vote.  Currently, the uniform rules
of JNC procedure prohibit open deliberations and do not
require recording of the votes.137 Also, legislative efforts in
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both houses to open JNC deliberations have failed.138 Allowing
the public to view deliberations would ensure that politics and
prejudices are not playing a role in the final selection.  More
importantly, if the final selection is challenged, the voting
process would be documented for review.139 Thus, JNC delib-
erations should be made open to the public to eliminate the
potential for wrongdoing.
Finally, another solution for removing politics is to implement
a law severely limiting contact between candidates, or their sup-
porters, and JNC members.  Recently, JNC members discussed
developing an advisory letter informing applicants of what con-
stitutes appropriate contact with JNC members.140 However,
such a mandate would be more effective if it were implemented
as part of the uniform rules of JNC procedure or as a provision
under § 43.29 of the Florida Statutes.  Specifically, this mandate
would permit a JNC to publicly announce a time period in which
it could receive information on the judicial candidates.  Once the
specified time period has expired, any contact regarding the can-
didates would be deemed unlawful lobbying.  This may result in
disciplinary measures or penalties for the respective candidate.
Furthermore, this mandate would require JNC members to
immediately disclose any contacts received after the specified
time period from either the candidates or their supporters,141 or
they too may be subject to discipline.  Establishing a rule or law
limiting lobbying efforts would curb the appearance of political
influence while allowing for public participation.
These proposed solutions to the concern of potential politi-
cal influence in the merit selection process virtually eliminate
politics while maintaining the delicate balance between judicial
independence and accountability.
Proposed Changes in Merit Retention
The core problem with merit retention is not so much the
return of campaign funding issues as it is the lack of informa-
tion to assist the average voter.  In fact, the proposed solutions
for improving the publication of merit retention information
may help resolve the issues associated with retention cam-
paign funding.
First, the electorate must be edu-
cated on the merit retention
process.  Studies have showed that
a majority of Florida voters are con-
fused about the retention
process.142 However, in order for
the public to appreciate merit reten-
tion, the public must first under-
stand the fundamentals of the judi-
ciary.143 Specifically, the public
should understand the importance
of a judge’s impartiality in decisions based on the rule of law144
and the distinct functions of the trial and appellate courts.
Then local newspapers and the Florida Bar should join forces
to educate the public on how the merit retention system works
and what the expectations are from the electorate.145 Once the
public understands the merit retention process, then it should
be provided with adequate information regarding a judge’s
record in order to assess judicial performance when determin-
ing a judge’s retention.  This could be accomplished by com-
bining bar ratings with sufficient information from an inde-
pendent source.
For instance, in 1988, Colorado established performance
evaluation commissions.  These commissions, composed of
lawyers and lay persons, assess judicial performance and pro-
vide information to both the public and the judges being eval-
uated.146 Specifically, the commissions distribute question-
naires to court personnel, law enforcement officers, jurors, and
other people who regularly converse with the courts.147
Commission members also personally interview the judges
and observe them in the courtroom.148 Upon completion of
their evaluations, the commissions educate the public and
inform the judges who have been evaluated with the results.149
This method of judicial evaluation, which employs citizen par-
ticipation, was deemed a success and became part of Colorado
law.150 Incidentally, this program was formed on the belief that
public interest in retention elections would increase if the pub-
lic was involved in the evaluation process.151
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Another suggestion
would be to expand the
Florida Bar’s Judicial
Evaluation Committee’s cur-
rent judicial evaluation pro-
gram.  This committee pri-
marily monitors the perfor-
mance of all judges,
whether sitting or up for
retention, by distributing
secret ballots to attorneys
statewide.152 The results are
shared with the judges who participate in the program and the
public.153 However, this program could be expanded to include
more extensive evaluations of those judges seeking retention.
Like Colorado’s citizen-based commissions, the bar’s Judicial
Evaluation Committee could conduct similar detailed evalua-
tions of the judges up for retention and publish the results.
This evaluation, coupled with bar poll ratings, may be more
effective when informing the public on judicial performance.
Additionally, recommendations from the Judicial
Qualifications Commission would significantly increase the
credibility of information on judicial performance.  Currently,
the JQC is only charged with investigating judges for alleged
misconduct.154 However, a constitutional amendment broad-
ening the JQC’s authority to include evaluations of judges who
are seeking retention would be very beneficial.155 Thus, com-
bined information on judicial performance produced from the
Florida Bar poll ratings, reports from an evaluation commis-
sion (whether citizen based or a bar subcommittee), and the
JQC may prove very effective in providing the necessary assis-
tance to average voters so they could better review the record
of a judge who is seeking retention.
Moreover, candid information on judicial performance from
these sources may curb the need to campaign against opposi-
tion because the record will sufficiently speak for itself.  In the
event a judge’s retention is opposed, the news media should
permit the judge to publicly respond, and the response should
be limited to an explanation of the legal reasoning or principle
exercised in the case at issue.156 More importantly, in the event
a judge’s record is unjustly criticized, the local bar association
should assist in “setting the record straight.”157 Naturally, the
public is best served if these responses were published in news-
papers that are widely circulated, and not just in legal publica-
tions.158 Thus, providing explicit information on judicial per-
formance coupled with limiting the mode of response to oppo-
sition may essentially abrogate the need for retention election
campaigning and fund raising.
The success of merit retention depends on properly educat-
ing the public on the merit retention system and adequately
conveying to the public effective and sufficient information
regarding the judges’ records.159 Also, setting boundaries for a
judge’s response to opposition may alleviate the need for cam-
paigning and fund raising.  Thus, these proposed solutions vir-
tually eliminate the potential appearance of impropriety asso-
ciated with judicial campaigns while maintaining democratic
participation.
CONCLUSION
A majority of Florida voters have decided to continue elect-
ing their trial judges and preserve a democratic means for
choosing judges that only judicial elections can provide.
However, the inherent need for campaign contributions ren-
ders the elective system unsuitable for judicial selection.
Furthermore, the various statutory provisions and ethical
codes on campaign practices do not eliminate the appearance
of impropriety entirely.  The merit system was promoted as the
great compromise between the democratic accountability pro-
vided in popular elections and the essential judicial indepen-
dence provided in direct appointments.  Although this com-
promise appears viable, the same political influence that per-
meated direct appointment and the same campaign issues that
plagued popular elections are revisited.
For merit selection and retention to truly be a great com-
promise, modifications must be made in both systems.  The
proposed changes in JNC composition and procedures would
ensure more judicial independence and quality.  Also, provid-
ing useful information regarding a judge’s record from credible
sources would essentially alleviate the need for zealous cam-
paigning for retention.  The fact that the merit system has
already been in existence in Florida for over twenty years does
not denote success.  These changes should be considered and
implemented now if advocates want voters to extend the merit
system to the selection of trial court judges.  
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